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This thesis is a theoretical economics study of the formation of defense
alliances. It discusses the probability that countries, which are characterized by
both their perceptions about benefits and risks of alliance membership and the
gross domestic product, form an alliance.
Primarily, I created an alliance model with and without risk perceptions
based on the joint product model and the self-protection model. Next, I
examined the behavior of countries in the model. Finally, I considered the
implications of the results. The characteristics of the countries may influence the
alliance burden sharing and productivity of defense expenditure whose effects
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The study of military alliances using economic theory has continued since
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) first applied the public goods theory to this
subject. [Ref. 1] Their study and others following have focused mainly on the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO observed that the Warsaw
Treaty Organization (WTO) was a common enemy in a bipolar world system.
NATO was therefore designed to protect its members from WTO aggression. In
fact, the NATO alliance has deterred WTO aggression against its members and
its members have correspondingly benefited from the alliance. Most of these
previous studies view the alliance from a positive standpoint, except for some
problems, such as disproportionate burden sharing. [Ref. 2]
In other regions, such as East Asia, military alliances like NATO do not
exist. However, some two-country-alliances do exist, such as the United States-
Japan Treaty. From the standpoint of economic theory, little is known about
such alliances. The common enemy is much less obvious than it was for
Western Europe during the Cold War. Thus, joining an alliance in this
circumstance would not always benefit all allies. For example, an ally could be
involved in a war in which they would not have been involved had it not been for
the alliance. Some countries consider the main benefit of an alliance is
deterrence while some countries think alliances are risky.
The question addressed here is how the perceptions of member countries
influence the formation of an alliance. Depending on perceptions, do they join
an alliance or remain independent?
This paper is a theoretical economic study on the formation of defense
alliances. It will analyze perceptions of countries in an alliance and discuss the
effects of these perceptions on alliance formation. Finally, it will discuss the
implications for alliance formation.
B. OBJECTIVES
This paper discusses the probability that countries, which are
characterized by both their perceptions about the benefits and risks of alliance
membership and their gross domestic product, form an alliance. It also
discusses the prospective effect of changes in the size of the countries on
alliance formation.
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATION
This paper considers the formation of a defense alliance between two
countries. Although I acknowledge that there are uncountable factors that
influence the formation of alliances and relationships between countries, such as
economic, ideological, racial, religious and historical factors, I would like to focus
on the country's perception of the risk and benefit from an alliance.
The countries are assumed to be almost identical and are democratic and
capitalist. They relate to each other so much economically that a war against
one of them can influence the other country. For this reason, they do not prefer
war and think of their defense power as a deterrence. Besides, their utility is
measured by the amount of money they can spend for private goods. In
addition, this paper will discuss the formation of alliances based on two
assumptions.
1. Assumption 1
The countries discussed are assumed to be rational players. They are not
assumed to take reckless actions. They make decisions by themselves on
whether or not to join an alliance and seek to maximize their utility.
2. Assumption 2
Defense expenditures are determined by a Nash equilibrium. The country
decides on the defense expenditure that maximizes its utility after observing the
defense expenditures selected by the other ally. The second country reacts in
the same way. As these actions continue, their defense expenditures approach
a Nash equilibrium.
D. METHODOLOGY
• Research previous studies on alliances using economic theory.
• Create an alliance model without risk perception based on the joint
product model and the self-protection.
•
•
Develop an alliance model with risk from the alliance model without
risk.
Examine the behavior of countries using the alliance model with risk.
• Consider the implications of the model results.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been several models employed to examine economic theory
in military alliances. One model is a purely public model introduced by Olson
and Zeckhauser. It focuses mainly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and discusses an alliance as a pure public good. Another model is the
joint product model employed by Sandler. The model was developed from the
purely public model and discusses an alliance as an impurely public model.
[Refs. 2 and 3] The other type of model is the self-protection model constructed
by Ehrich and Becker.
1. Purely Public Product Model
Olson and Zeckhauser applied economic theory to the study of military
alliances initially in 1966. [Ref. 1] They discussed NATO and observed that
WTO was a common enemy of NATO and that deterring WTO aggression
against any NATO members was in the common interest of all members. In the
1950s and 1960s, NATO depended primarily on deterrence and mainly on the
U.S. stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. Reliance on nuclear weapons was
essential since the conventional forces of NATO were much smaller than that of
the Russian forces. From these observations, a military alliance is defined as a
group of countries that provides protection to all members from aggression by
common enemies. Accordingly, Olson and Zeckhauser considered deterrence
as a pure public good. [Ref. 1] Measuring the size of an ally by its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), they examined the effect of GDP on defense
expenditures as a percent of GDP in a Nash equilibrium. Olson and Zeckhauser
also assumed that all allies are equal to one another in every aspect other than
the GDP. [Ref. 1] In particular, the allies share the same perception of the
threat and the effect of an alliance on deterrence. Under these assumptions,
Olson and Zechauser explain the formation of NATO predicting disproportionality
in defense burden sharing; larger allies shoulder the defense burden of the
smaller allies. [Ref. 1] In their studies, despite the problems of
disproportionality, countries are always better off cooperating than being
isolated.
2. The Joint Product Model
Extending the pure public goods theory, Sandler employed a joint product
model to explain observed reductions in disproportionality (as measured by
defense expenditures as a percent of GDP) between the rich and poor allies in
NATO during the 1970s and 1980s. [Ref. 4] In the joint product model, military
expenditures are viewed as being purely public, impurely public, and private
goods. For example, purely public goods include deterrence provided by
strategic nuclear weapons, impurely public goods include damage limiting
protection provided by conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, and private
goods include forces policing terrorist activity at home. A country like the United
States maintains both nuclear and conventional forces and uses them for a
variety of both public and private purposes. In addition, NATO placed increasing
reliance on conventional weapons relative to nuclear weapons under the
doctrine of flexible response in the 1970s. From these observations, Sandler
and others explain the formation of NATO by using the joint product model.
The joint product model appears to add more understanding to the NATO
alliance. In particular, the model predicts that technological and strategic changes,
associated with an alliance arsenal, can alter the mix of public benefits. However,
the mix of public and private benefits is uniquely determined by the mix of weapons
in the alliance's arsenal and the alliance's defense strategy, e.g., flexible response.
This model also concludes that allies are never at a disadvantage from the alliance.
3. The Self-Protection Model
From another point of view, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) discuss a defense
model as the 'self-protection' Model. [Ref. 5] With this model, they studied the
behavior of a country that is assumed to seek its maximum expected utility;
maximum expected utility combines utilities at peacetime and at during war, using
the probability of war. Toshitaka Fukiharu applied the self-protection model to
explain alliances and arms races between two countries. [Ref. 6]
I consider it inappropriate to maintain an alliance that benefits all potential
allies. Other studies have assumed that an alliance benefits all allies and have no
doubt that it is better for a country to cooperate than to be isolated. This assumption
comes from the circumstances surrounding NATO during the Cold War. It is
inappropriate in other regions, and especially after the collapse of the bipolar system
of NATO and WTO. Countries do not share a perception of a common enemy in the
other regions. In other words, countries observe their unique enemies regarding
their individual national interests. In international relations, it is good for a country
that an alliance would protect it and would deter war against its adversary; however,
there is a risk that the alliance would force a country to contribute to a war initiated
against another ally. There is also a risk that the alliance would destabilize the
balance of power and increase the probability of war. Some countries may perceive
an alliance as a benefit; other countries may not.
Taking international relations into account, this paper will discuss how the
perceptions of countries influence the formation of an alliance. Does a country
cooperate, or does a country become isolated? Examining behaviors of
countries with mathematical models, this paper will consider the implications of
these perceptions on alliance formation.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. ALLIANCE MODEL WITHOUT RISK PERCEPTION
Consider an original alliance model without risk perception based on the
previous studies as the first step in analyzing the behavior of the countries
regarding an alliance. In the model, defense goods are considered as purely or
impurely public goods, the utilities of a country are measured by the
expenditures for private goods, and expected utility depends on both the
probabilities of peace and war and the utilities at peace and at war. The
objective of a country is to maximize its expected utility subject to its resource
constraint of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
1. Model Structure
Consider the alliance model without risk perception where there are two
friendly countries, Country 1 and Country 2, and their adversaries, Enemy A and
Enemy B. As both countries are rational players, each country independently
decides on its defense expenditure by maximizing its utility subject to its income
constraint.
In addition, there is the possibility of two wars. One war is War A where
Enemy A would attack Country 1 , the other war is War B where Enemy B would
attack Country 2. Countries 1 and 2 suffer losses from both War A and War B.
For these reasons, Country 1 and Country 2 are interested in a bilateral military
alliance to prevent both wars.
In the model, let the notation be as follows:
i and j = Friendly countries: 1 or 2
k and m = Enemies and wars: A or B *
s = Situation: 0, 1, 2, 3
*
Uj = Expected utility of Country i
UjS = Utility of Country i under Situation s
Gj = Gross domestic product of Country i
X| = The quantity of private goods purchased by Country i
Yj = The quantity of defense goods purchased by Country i
LjS = Loss that Country i suffers under Situation s
Ey = Portion of Country j's defense goods which contribute to Country i
Zj = Country i's deterrence
PjS = Probability that Situation s occurs
a, = Utility coefficient of Country i
Pi Price of private goods in Country i
l is
= Coefficient for Country i's loss suffered from situations that Country i
estimates
djk = Effectiveness coefficient of deterrence of War k that Country i
estimates
q* = Probability of War k that Country i estimates
*
• Wars are defined as follows:
War A: War where Enemy A attacks Country 1
War B: War where Enemy B attacks Country 2





Situation where neither War A nor War B occurs
Situation where War A occurs
Situation where War B occurs
Situation where both War A and War B occur
Under the alliance, Z, represents Country i's total consumption of the





Though Country i produces Y, of defense expenditure, it perceives that E
y
of Yj is relevant to Country j's defense. In other words, Country i perceives that
Country j contributes Ei} of its defense expenditure to Country i. In general, Ey
should be a value between and 1 . If E
ti
= 1 , Country j's defense expenditures
are purely public. Conversely, if E
n
= 0, its defense expenditures are purely
private. That is, Country i perceives no commitment to its defense from Country j
and Country i cannot depend on Country j's assistance in its defense
calculations. [Ref. 7]
2. Objective
The objective of the country in this model is to maximize its expected
utility composed of the probabilities of peace and wars and its utilities at peace
and at war.
3. Probabilities of Peace and Wars
Assume that the probability of War k, or q
k
,
is a function of Z
t
because
Country i's deterrence, or Zit prevents the war against Country i by Enemy k, or
q (
k
. Thus, as Z
s
increases, q ;
k decreases. More specifically, q* should be
between and 1, and a concave-down-function of Z,; dZJdo^ is negative, and
d2 Z/Qf2qj
k
is positive. Therefore, it is assumed that Country i would estimate q
k






Generally, d* should also be a value that is greater than 0. If djk=0, Zj
does not have any effect on deterrence and Country i perceives that War k will
occur regardless of Z;, if d k>0, Z
x
is effective and q^ decreases as Z, increases.
Concerning the two wars, the situations in the model are classified into
four cases. In Situation 0, neither War A nor War B occurs; this is peacetime. In
Situation 1 , only War A occurs. In Situation 2, War B occurs. In Situation 3, both
War A and War B occur. Since only four situations are possible, the sum of the
probabilities of war in each situation, or P,8 , must satisfy:
Etf-i
j=0
Using q* , P,s is denoted by the following four equations:
r,0 . A B A B
P, =1-?,
-q, + q, q,
4. Utilities at Peacetime and at War
The utilities of the countries in each situation are measured by their
expenditure for private goods. The expenditure for private goods in the case of a
war is less than that during peacetime. The reduction in private goods is called a
loss by war. Country i estimates the loss suffered under Situation s, or LjS , would
be a portion of its GDP, or GL . When s = during peacetime, Country i loses
nothing and 1° is zero. Compared to Situation 0, Country i estimates the loss





For convenience, suppose that loss from both wars, or lj3
,
is the sum of
the losses from each war. Thus, the following equation denotes I,3:
Including the loss, Country i estimates its utility under Situation s by the
following equation, where a, is its utility elasticity:
10
Country i's expected utility is expressed as follows:
5=0
5. Constraint
Subject to its resource constraint, each country in this model selects its
own defense expenditure to maximize its expected utility. The country's
resource is its gross domestic product (GDP), which is denoted by Gj. Country
i's constraint is represented by the equation below, where Pj is the price of the





As described above, Country 1 responds to Country 2's defense
expenditure and determines its defense expenditure to maximize its expected
utility subject to its resource constraint; and Country 2 does so as well. By
responding to one another, defense expenditures in both countries approach an
equilibrium point, called a Nash equilibrium.
B. ALLIANCE MODEL WITH RISK PERCEPTION
Whereas previous alliance models see an alliance as providing at least
partially public goods, which benefit all allies, I would like to emphasize that an
alliance may involve risks as well as benefits.
The following contingencies could be happen. Once a country joins an
alliance, it would have to deal with all wars with which an ally of the alliance is
associated. 1 Thus, the country could be dragged into a war in which it would not
be involved without the alliance, and would suffer some loss from the war. In
addition, once a country joins an alliance, it upsets the balance of power
surrounding the alliance. This could lead to an increased probability of war
involving the alliance, increasing the cost of war for all alliance members. These
contingencies could decrease the utility of the country joining an alliance. We
1
The exception is alliances that specify a common adversary. [Ref. 9]
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call the case where forming an alliance reduces utility of the allies as an alliance
with risk.
For this reason, there are many countries that hold a variety of
perceptions regarding the risk of alliances. For example, countries that have had
bad experiences with wars may perceive risk from an alliance rather than benefit.
On the other hand, countries that have won wars and use the military as a
political tool, may perceive mainly benefits from an alliance rather than risk. In
the alliance model without risk, the alliance is perceived as pure or impure public
goods. In other words, both countries always perceive a benefit from the
alliance.
Suppose that there are two types of countries in terms of the benefit and
the risk from an alliance: Type 1 is a country that perceives only benefits from
the alliance, like the alliance model without risk. Type 2 is a country that
perceives the risk from the alliance as well as the benefit.
1. Type of Country
With regards to the risk and benefit perception, consider two types of
countries, Type 1 and Type 2. To create the risk alliance model, I would like to
focus attention on the probability of wars and change the alliance model without
risk to incorporate risk perceptions.
Type 1 countries perceive only benefits. Like the alliance model without
risk, it is assumed that the country perceives that the alliance could decrease the
probabilities of wars against not only itself but also the other country joining the
alliance. Thus, the contribution by Type 1 Country to the other country joining
the alliance could increase Type 1 Country's utility; the contribution by the other
country to Type 1 Country also increases Type 1 Country's utility.
Type 2 Country perceives the risk as well as the benefit. In contrast to
Type 1 Country, Type 2 Country perceives that an alliance decreases the
probability of war against only itself but increases the probability that it will be
drawn into a war against the other country joining the alliance. Thus, the
12
contribution by Type 2 Country to the other country joining the alliance can
reduce Type 2 Country's utility if its ally is involved in a war, but the contribution
by the other country to Type 2 Country increases Type 2 Country's utility. Simply
put, Type 2 Country welcomes help from the other country, but perceives
potential cost if it helps the other country.
Let us discuss the types of countries mathematically. This analysis
changes the probability of the war function in the alliance model without risk
perception to reflect risk perceptions. Except for the probabilities of wars, Type 1
and Type 2 are represented by the same equations regarding its objective and
constraint.
a. Type 1
Type 1 Country's perception of the probabilities of war is expressed









Yj )), for i, j = 1 ,2 and i * j
According to this equation, as E^ and E^ increase unilaterally,
probabilities of Wars k and m, q^ and q™, will decrease respectively. In other
words, the higher level of cooperation makes the probability of both wars
decrease.
b. Type 2
Type 2 Country's perception about the probabilities of Wars k and




for i, j= 1,2 and i *j
When i =1, k=A and m=B.
When i =2, k=B and m=A
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The difference compared to the Type 1 country is the minus sign in
the second equation above; this sign was positive in the equation for Type 1
Country. In the second equation, (Yp^Y,) is used instead of (Y, +E^{). As a
result, q™ will increase if E^ increases unilaterally, while q* will decrease if E
y
increases unilaterally. Thus, the higher level of cooperation makes the
probability of War k decrease. However, it makes the probability of War m
increase. As a consequence, it can be presumed that risk has been introduced
into the alliance model.
2. Combination of Countries
In this paper, presume three combinations of countries. Combination 1 is
Type 1 and Type 1 , Combination 2 is Type 2 and Type 2, and Combination 3 is
Type 1 and Type 2.
a. Combination 1
Both Countries 1 and 2 are Type 1 countries. See Appendices 1
and 2. They perceive benefits from the alliance. Country 1 observes both
Enemies A and B as adversaries as does Country 2. In other words, they share
common adversaries like NATO did during the Cold War. At that time, the Soviet
Union had been extending its domain and increasing its influence on surrounding
countries. Aggression by the Soviet Union became the biggest threat to all
western countries including the United States. To deter aggression, the
countries established NATO where all members shared a common adversary,
the Soviet Union.
b. Combination 2
Both Countries 1 and 2 are Type 2 Countries. See Appendices 3
and 4. Both Countries 1 and 2 perceive the risk and benefit of an alliance. In
other words, Country 1 does not consider Enemy B, only Enemy A as its
adversary, while Country 2 does not consider Enemy A, only Enemy B as its
adversary.
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This combination, for example, represents the current situation
at NATO. After the Cold War, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the threat to
western countries has been decreasing. Additionally, as the eastern countries
begin to join NATO, the common adversaries are becoming more and more
ambiguous; each member faces increasingly unique adversaries.
Another example is peacekeeping operations, PKO, by the
United Nations. While U.N. members think that the U.N. is valuable for their
security, they also think that there are risks involved in cooperating with the
PKO. The wars among the countries under the current PKO do not affect all
members. There is no common nor obvious adversaries for all U.N. members.
c. Combination 3
Country 1 is Type 2 and Country 2 is Type 1. See Appendices
5 and 6. Country 1 perceives both the risk and the benefit of the alliance, while
Country 2 perceives mainly the benefit of the alliance. In other words, all
adversaries for Country 1 are adversaries of Country 2, while only some of the
adversaries of Country 2 are adversaries of Country 1 . Enemy A, the main
adversary of Country 1, is an adversary of Country 2; Enemy B, the main
adversary of Country 2, is not the adversary of Country 1
.
An example is the relationship between the United States and
Japan. The United States thinks that all of the enemies that may attack Japan
are its adversaries. However, Japan does not feel that all of the enemies facing
the United States are adversaries of Japan. Japan plans to use its military to
defend only itself and does not think that its armed forces may operate except in
the Far East. [Ref. 8]
C. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Nash equilibrium determines each country's defense expenditure. The
equations representing the country's characters are shown in Appendices 1 to
6. As its reaction curve equation shows, Country 1 responds to the amount of
the Country 2's defense expenditure and decides on its defense expenditure to
15
maximize its expected utility subject to its resource constraint. Country 2 does
the same as its reaction curve equation shows. As they respond to one another,
their defense expenditures approach an equilibrium point called a Nash
equilibrium.
From a graphical standpoint, a reaction curve represents the amount of
defense expenditure that one of the countries selects in response to another
country's defense expenditure. Both countries have their own reaction curve.
The point where the reaction lines cross one another is their Nash equilibrium
point.
To illustrate the three combinations, suppose that there are two alliance
members and that the GDP and the parameters take the values indicated in
Table 1 . These values depict the two countries as identical with the exception of
the GDP.
G, ai di1 di2 liO Ii1 Ii2 II3
Country 1 80 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6
Country 2 100 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6
Table 1. Illustrative Parameter Values
For example, look at the reaction curves, where E 12 = E21 = 0.0, 0.5, 1.0,
under Combinations 1, 2, and 3.
1. Combination 1
Figure 1 shows reaction curves in Combination 1. In the figure, dotted
curves represent Country 1's reaction curves, solid curves represent the Country
2's reaction curve, and solid dots represent Nash equilibrium points. Table 2
shows each country's defense expenditures at the Nash equilibrium points. If
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Figure 1. Reaction Curve in Combination 1
Country 1 Country 2
E12=E21=0.0 9.76 10.92
E12=E21=0.5 5.74 9.56
E 12=E21=1.0 O 12.92
Table 2. Defense Expenditure at Nash Equilibrium Point in Combination 1
2. Combination 2
Figure 2 shows reaction curves in Combination 2, and Table 3 shows
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Figure 2. Reaction Curve in Combination 2
Country 1 Country 2
E 12=E21 =0.0 9.76 10.92
E 12=E21=0.5 3.94 4.38
E12=E21=1.0 1.00 1.20
Table 3. Defense Expenditure at Nash Equilibrium in Combination 2
3. Combination 3
Figure 3 shows reaction curves in Combination 3, and Table 4 shows
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Figure 3. Reaction Curve in Combination 3
Country 1 Country 2
E 12=E21=0.0 9.76 10.92
E 12=E21=0.5 2.78 11.90
E 12=E21=1.0 0.00 12.92
Table 4. Defense Expenditure at Nash Equilibrium Point in Combination 3
From these examples, we can determine each country's defense
expenditures from the graphical representation. In these figures, the Nash
equilibrium approaches the point where their reaction lines cross one another as
both countries continue to interact, regardless of the initial standing point.
While Countries 1 and 2 in Combination 1 have a similar shaped reaction
curves, since they are the same type of countries, countries in Combination 3
have different shaped reaction curves. In Combination 3, Country 1 tends to
reduce its defense expenditure as the level of cooperation increases because it
perceives negative impact on its utility. As a result, the disproportionality of
defense burden between the countries in Combination 3 is greater than that of
19
Combination 1 or 2.
The next chapter examines each country's utility at the Nash equilibrium




Using the alliance models with risk, I would like to examine the three
combinations in terms of the expected utilities at Nash equilibrium and consider
the effect of an alliance on both utility and the implications for alliance formation.
In Combination 1, both Countries 1 and 2 are Type 1 countries, which perceive
benefits from alliance. In Combination 2, both Countries 1 and 2 are Type 2
countries, which perceive risks and benefits of alliances. In Combination 3,
Country 1 is a Type 2 country and Country 2 is a Type 1 country. Country 1
perceives risks and benefits of the alliance, while Country 2 only perceives
benefits.
For each combination, I will discuss both a symmetrical case and an
asymmetrical case regarding Ejj. The symmetrical case is defined as a case
where E 12 is equal to E 21 . The asymmetrical case is defined as the case where
E12 may not equal E 21 . Using the symmetrical case, the relationship between the
expected utility and defense expenditure is discussed. The relationship of
expected utility between Countries 1 and 2 is discussed in the asymmetrical
case.
To illustrate the symmetric case, suppose that the parameters of the two
countries in each combination take the values indicated in Table 5. These
values imply that the two countries are identical with the exception of GDP.
Gi 3| Ldi1 di2 HO Ii1 I,2 li3
Countryl 80 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6
Country2 100 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6




Table 6 shows defense expenditures, expected utilities, and the difference
in expected utility between the isolation and alliance case. AU1 and AU2 denote




(E12=E21 ) Y1 Y2 U1.AU1 U2, AU2
9.76 10.92 7.95, 0.00 9.00, 0.00
0.25 7.76 9.74 8.12, +0.17 9.12, +0.12
0.5 5.74 9.56 8.27, +0.33 9.17, +0.17
0.75 1.60 12.12 8.54, +0.60 9.07, +0.07
1.0 0.00 12.92 8.72, +0.77 9.06, +0.06
Table 6. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure





















Figure 4. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure
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From the figure, we can see that Country 1's utility increases with Eg, while
Country 2's utility can increase or decrease depending on the value of E
ti
.
For Country 1, the increase in E
s
increases the productivity of defense
expenditures and decreases its burden. Therefore, the slope of the curve
representing Country 1's utility is positive.
On the other hand, the slope of the curves representing Country 2's utility
and defense expenditure wave. When Eg is less than 0.5, the slope of the curve
representing U2 can be positive; Country 2 decreases its defense expenditure as
the productivity of its defense expenditure increases. In contrast, the slope is
negative when Eg is between 0.5 and 0.75; as Country 1 perceives a larger
contribution from its larger ally, its defense expenditures decrease at an
increasing rate. Country 2's defense expenditures must increase to
compensate. This creates disproportional burden sharing due to an increase in
Eg. In this range, Country 2's defense expenditures increase, while Country 1's
defense expenditure decreases in the Nash equilibrium. In this way, the net
implications for Country 2 depend on the balance of the increase in productivity
and the increase in alliance burden.
2. Asymmetrical Case
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the utilities of Countries 1 and 2
at various levels of cooperation using circles. The utilities of the countries in the
isolation case are represented by a solid dot. Let us divide the field in the figure
into four regions, based on the isolation point, and consider the region in which
the circles appear.
Figure 5 shows the upper left region, named Region 1, includes cases
where alliance is better than isolation, in terms of utility, for Country 2 but not for
Country 1. The upper right region is Region 2, where alliance is better for both
Countries 1 and 2. The lower left region is Region 3 where alliance is worse for
Countries 1 and 2. The lower right region is Region 4 where alliance is better for
Country 1 but worse for Country 2.
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As we see in Figure 5, almost all circles are in Region 2; some circles are
in Regions 1 and 4, but these points are near the boundary of Region 2. These
results indicate that an alliance can benefit both countries as the level of
cooperation increases. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the countries



















Figure 5. Utility Relationship Between Countries 1 And 2
It is necessary to look at the details of the change in these utilities to
consider when the utilities in alliance are lower than that of isolation. Table 7
shows Countries 1 and 2's utilities at different levels of cooperation, E 12 and E21 .
In the table, the upper number in a cell represents the expected utility and the
lower number denotes the difference in the expected utility between the isolation
and alliance case, or the utility in alliance minus that of isolation. The light
colored cells represent cases where the expected utilities of either or both
countries are less than the isolation case.
24



















































































































































Table 7. Countries 1 and 2's Utility in Combination 1
As seen in the table, Country 1's utility is 8.72 with complete cooperation,
where E 12 = E21 = 1 , and 7.95 in isolation, where E 12 = E21 = 0. If Country 1 has
only these two options, there is no doubt that Country 1 would cooperate with
Country 2.
But what happens if Country 1 could reduce its commitment to Country 2.
In the case where E 12 = 1, Country 1 does not spend any resources on defense.
The contribution by Country 1 to Country 2 is always regardless of E21 . This
means that Country 1's utility is not influenced by E21 . In the case where E12 is
not 1, however, Country 1 devotes resources to defense expenditures and
contributes a portion of its defense expenditure to Country 2. Consider the case
where E12 = 0.75. If Country 1 changes E21 from 1 to 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, and 0, its
utility increases from 8.31 to 8.54, 8.61, and 8.62. Likewise, in the case where
E12=0.5, 0.25, 0.0, as Country 1 reduces E21 unilaterally, its utility increases.
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Similarly, Country 2 also gets higher utility by reducing its commitment to
Country 1. In the case where E21 is 1, if Country 2 changes E 12 from 1 to 0.75,
0.5, 0.25, and 0, its utility increases from 9.06 to 9.34, 9.65, and 9.68.
This situation is like the prison dilemma. If each of the two countries can
disclose its reduction in contribution to the other, both countries are likely to
reduce their contribution. Ultimately, they would isolate themselves from each
other. As a consequence, both countries might move toward isolation even
though cooperation is clearly better for both than isolation.
If the countries do not communicate with each other and exchange
information on the level of the contribution, the instability of the alliance
increases, even though an alliance would benefit both countries. Hence,
communication is critical in forming an alliance, even if the potential members
mainly perceive a benefit from an alliance. Assuming both countries continue to
exchange and monitor information about their alliance commitments, there is a




Table 8 shows the defense expenditure, expected utilities, and differences
in expected utility between the isolation and alliance cases. AU1 and AU2
denote the differences in Country 1's and Country 2's utilities, respectively.
From the table, if E
jr
increases, the expected utilities of both countries
decrease, suggesting that alliance would be worse for both countries.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the amount of defense
expenditures and the expected utilities graphically. The figure shows again that
expected utilities and defense expenditures decrease if Ejj increases. In
Combination 2, Country 1 perceives that more cooperation increases the
probability of War B but decreases the probability of War A, and Country 2
26
E, (E12=E21 ) Y1 Y2 U1.AU1 U2, AU2
9.76 10.92 7.95, 0.00 9.00, 0.00
0.25 6.68 7.54 7.85, -01MW
0.5 3.94 4.38 7 -44,
~°wbA.
8,28,-
0.75 2.08 2.34 6.92,-1.03 ' -.
1.0 1.00 1.20 6.46,-1,49 7.12,:-I.88rj
Table 8. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure
Figure 6. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure
perceives that more cooperation increases the probability of War A but
decreases the probability of War B. In this example, both countries reduce their
defense expenditure as the cooperation level increases; both countries receive a
larger contribution from their ally toward avoiding their own war, and their own
defense expenditures have a greater adverse impact on the probability of war for
their ally. Since both countries reduce defense expenditures, the alliance is not
better for either country in this example. Consequently, there is a very low
probability that the countries in Combination 2 will form an alliance.
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However, an alliance might be better for Country 1 , if the probability of
War B is much lower compared to that of War A, or if the expected damage
Country 1 suffers from War B is or much smaller than the decrease in expected
damage from War A. In this example, the same value of 0.2 is assumed for the
coefficients of the probabilities, d^ and d, B as well as d2A and d2B . In addition, the
damage from War A is twice as great as that of War B. The damage from War A
is 40% of GDP; the damage from War B is 20% of the GDP. In this example, the
effect of the alliance on the probabilities of war A and B indicate that an alliance
is worse for Country 1 . In the same way, an alliance is also worse for Country 2.
Whether an alliance is a benefit or risk depends on the ratio of the damage from
War A to War B and the impact of alliance on respective probabilities of war.
2. Asymmetrical Case
Figure 7 graphs the relationship between the utilities of Countries 1 and 2
at the various levels of cooperation using circles, and the utilities in the isolation
case using a solid dot.
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Figure 7. Utility Relationship Between Countries 1 And 2
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As Figure 7 shows, the circles are almost all distributed in Region 3,
where cooperation is worse for both Countries 1 and 2. Some circles are in
Region 1 and Region 4 where only one of the two countries benefits from an
alliance but they are near the border of Region 3. The two circles in Region 1
represent the case where E 12 = and E2 i = 0.25 and 0.5, and the two circles in
Region 4 represent the case where E2i= and E12 = 0.25 and 0.5. This means
that one of the countries benefits from an alliance only when the other country
unilaterally contributes to its defense without expecting compensation. According
to Figure 7, it is impossible for both countries to benefit from an alliance in this
example.
Table 9 shows Countries 1 and 2's utilities at different levels of
cooperation, E12 and E21. In the table, the upper number in a cell represents the
expected utility and the lower number denotes the difference in the expected
utility between isolation and alliance, (i.e., the utility in alliance minus that of
isolation). The lightly shaded cells represent cases where the expected utility of
one country is higher than the isolation case, and the darkly colored cells
represent the cases where the expected utilities of both countries are less than
the isolation case.
This table further illustrates the difficulty in forming an alliance between
these countries. It is unreasonable for either country to increase their
commitment to the other country because their utilities decrease as the level of
cooperation increase. Therefore, there is little possibility that the countries in
Combination 2 would form an alliance.
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Table 9. Countries 1 and 2's Utility in Combination 2
This table further illustrates the difficulty in forming an alliance between
these countries. It is unreasonable for either country to increase their
commitment to the other country because their utilities decrease as the level of
cooperation increase. Therefore, there is little possibility that the countries in
Combination 2 would form an alliance.
C. COMBINATION 3
1. Symmetrical case
Table 10 shows the defense expenditures, the expected utilities, and the
differences in expected utility between the isolation and alliance cases. AIM and
AU2 denote the differences in Country 1's and Country 2's expected utility
between the isolation and alliance cases, respectively. A colored cell represents
the case where an alliance is worse for one of the countries. Country 1 is a
smaller country of Type 2 that perceives risks as well as benefits from the
alliance while Country 2 is a larger country of Type 1 that perceives benefits from
the alliance.
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Ejj VE12~ E2l) Y1 Y2 U1, AU1 U2, AU2
9.76 10.92 7.95, 0.00 9.00, 0.00
0.25 6.44 10.30 8.04, +0.09 9.06, +0.06
0.5 2.78 11.90 8.30, +0.35 9.01, +0.01
0.75 0.00 13.64 8.62, +0.67 8.98, -0.02
1.0 0.00 12.92 8.72, +0.77 9.06, +0.06
Table 10. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the amount of defense
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Figure 8. Expected Utility and Defense Expenditure
From the figure, we can see that Country 1's utility increases with E ijf while
Country 2's utility increases, decreases, and increases with Ey.
Country 1 perceives risks and benefits from the alliance. As E
y
increases,
Country 1's defense expenditures decrease the probability of War A but
increases the probability of War B. This means that the alliance decreases the
productivity of Country 1's defense expenditures. Because of Country 1's
negative effect on the probability of War B, an increase in the level of
cooperation decreases Country 1's defense expenditure more than in
31
Combination 1. Country 1's defense expenditures become zero when Ey is 0.75
in Combination 3, while it becomes zero when E
y
is 1.0 in Combination 1.
On the other hand, Country 2 perceives benefits from the alliance. As E
Sj
increases, Country 2's defense expenditures decrease the probability of both
Wars A and B. This means that the alliance increases the productivity of
Countries 2's defense expenditure. Due to the positive effect of the alliance on
the probability of War A and B, Country 2 compensates for the reduction in
Country 1's defense expenditure as the level of cooperation increases.
In this way, the increase in Ey decreases Country 1's burden and
increases Country 2's burden. As the result, Country 1 can reduce its defense
expenditure, keep the risk of the alliance low and receive contributions from
Country 2 by forming an alliance. Therefore, Country 1's expected utility
increases as Ey increases. In the other words, Country 1 is willing to form the
alliance.
In contrast, the curve representing the Country 2's expected utility rises,
falls, and rises as E
y
increases. Country 2's expected utility increases as Ey
increases when Ey is less than 0.25. For Country 2, the increase in Ey increases
the productivity of Country 2's defense expenditure, which decreases the
probability of both Wars A and B. The increase in the productivity allows Country
2 to decrease its defense expenditure, and thus the slope of the curve
representing Country 2's expected utility is positive in this range.
When Ey is between 0.25 and 0.75, the expected utility decreases as Ey
increases. In this range, Country 1 reduces its defense expenditure as E
y
increases because of the negative impact of alliance; Country 2 increases its
defense expenditure because of positive impact of the alliance. The negative
effect of an increase in y2 on Country 2's expected utility is more than the
positive effect of the increase in the productivity. As the result, Country 2's
expected utility decreases as Ey increases.
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When Eg is more than 0.75, Country 2's expected utility increases as Eg
increases. In this range, Country 2 shoulders the entire burden since Country
1's defense expenditure is 0. Even if Eg increases, the portion of the burden
Country 2 shoulders does not change because Country 1 cannot reduce its
defense expenditure further. As a result, the increase in the level of cooperation
decreases the probability of War A and allows Country 1 to reduce its defense
expenditures. Therefore, Country 2's expected utility increases as Eg increases
when Eg is more than 0.75.
The expected utilities depend on the balance between the productivity of
defense expenditures and the disproportionate level of burden sharing. The
disproportionate amount of burden sharing in Combination 3 is more obvious
than in Combination 1 because of Country 1's risk perception.
2. Asymmetrical case
The expected behaviors by the countries of Combination 3 in the
asymmetrical case are not as simple as in Combinations 1 and 2. For this
reason, let us discuss their utility after dividing Combination 3 into two cases,
based on GDP. The first case is where Country 1's GDP is 10 and Country 2's
GDP is 100. The second case is where Country 1's GDP is 80 and Country 2's
GDP is 100. Except for differences in the GDP and risk perception, Country 1
and Country 2 are identical.
a. Case (G1 = 10, G2 = 100)
In this case, Country 1's GDP is 10 and Country 2's GDP is 100.
Thus, Country 1 is much smaller than Country 2.
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the utilities of Countries 1
and 2 at various levels of cooperation using circles, and in isolation case using a
solid dot. We can see that circles are located only in Region 2 where
cooperation is better for both countries than isolation. Since both Countries 1
and 2 can benefit from an alliance without any loss, there is a higher probability
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Figure 9. Utility Relationship Between Countries 1 And 2
Table 11 shows Countries 1 and 2's expected utilities in
Combination 3. This further motivates the results in Figure 9 and reinforces the
high probability that these countries will form an alliance.
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Table 11. Countries 1 and 2's Utility in Combination 3 (G1 = 10, G2 = 100)
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According to the table, when E 12 is 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1.0, which
includes all alliance cases, Country 1 does not spend any resources on defense.
Country 2 shoulders all of the alliance burden. Country 1 is so comfortable with
Country 2's contribution that Country 1 does not perceive the need to spend
resources on defense. Country 1 can save its defense expenditure by forming
an alliance and leaving its defense to Country 2. As the result, Country 1
benefits from the alliance. For this reason, the productivity of Country 2's
defense expenditure is the only factor influencing both country's expected utility.
An alliance also benefits Country 2. According to Table 11, as E12
rises from 0.0 to 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0, Country 2's utility increases from 7.98
to 8.54, 8.83, 8.98, and 9.06. From Country 2's point of view, Country 1 does
not maintain sufficient deterrence. Thus, there is too a high possibility of a war
against Country 1 . If war occurs, Country 2 would suffer some damage. For this
reason, Country 2 does not want to leave Country 1 in isolation. Country 2 is
willing to form an alliance to deter War A, even though it shoulders the entire
alliance burden.
Consequently, the two countries in Combination 3 are very likely to
form an alliance when the Type 2 country's GDP is much smaller than the GNP
of the other country.
b. Case (G1=80, G2=100)
In this case, Country 1's GDP is 80 and Country 2's GDP is 100.
Country 1 perceives both risks and benefits from an alliance, and it is a little
smaller than Country 2 which perceives only benefits from an alliance.
Figure 10 shows the relationship between the utilities of Countries
1 and 2 in alliance using circles, and their utilities in isolation using a solid dot.
From the figure, we can see that the circles are distributed in all four regions. It
is not simple to determine who receives benefits. This case is more
unpredictable than the first case (G1=10, G2=100). Yet, an alliance still may be
formed because it is possible that both countries can benefit from an alliance.
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To see the details, Figure 10 shows the utilities of Countries 1 and
2 for different levels of cooperation.
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Figure 10. Utility Relationship Between Countries 1 and 2
El 2=0 E12==0.25 E12=0.5 El 2=0.75 E12=1.0
U1 =
I






























U1 = i U2= U1 = U2= U1 = U2= U1- : U2= U1 = U2=
E2 1=0.25
7.77 ! 9.08 8.04 9.06 8.34 9 8.62 • 8.98 8.72 ! 9.06
AU1 = ! AU2= AU1 = AU2= AU1 = AU2= AU1 = rAU2- AU1 = i AU2=
-0.18
! 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.39 0.01 0:67 [ -0.02 0.77 j 0.06
U1=
I
U2= U1 = U2= U1 = U2= U1- i U2= U1 = i U2=
E21=0.5
7.52 i 9.06 7.91 9.06 8.3 9.01 8.62-8.98 8.72 ! 9.06
AU1 = : AU2= AU1 = AU2= AU1 = AU2= 1 AU1~*AU2= AU1 = ; AU2=
-0.43
i 0.06 -0.03 0:07 0.35 0.01 0.6? [-0.02 0.77 ; 0.06




















0.04 0.34 0.67 [-0.02 0.77
;
0.06




\ BM 776 ; 8.99 8.29 8.98 8.62 -8.98 8.72 9.06
i AU2= AU1 = j AU2* AU1- AU2=" AU1=]AU2= AU1 = i AU2=
^X5li-Ci12 -019 c -aoi 0.34 -0.02 0.67 • -0.02 0.77 ; 0.06
Table 12. Countries 1 and 2's Utility in Combination 2 (G1 = 80, G2 = 100)
According to the table, Country 1 achieves the same utility
regardless of its commitment to Country 2 when E 12 is 1 or 0.75. When E12 is 1
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or 0.75, y., falls to zero so Country 1's commitment to Country 2 is irrelevant.
When E 12 is less than 0.75, Country 1 can increase its utility if it reduces E21
unilaterally. When E 12 is 0.25, for example, Country 1's utility rises from 7.76 to
7.82, 7.91, 8.04, and 8.15, as it reduces E 21 from 1 to 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0.0.
Therefore, Country 1 has an incentive to reduce its commitment to Country 2.
On the other hand, Country 2's behavior is classified into two
cases. In the first case, where E 12 is more than 0.75, an increase in E12 is better
for Country 2. In this case, Country 2 shoulders the entire defense burden.
Since Country 1's defense expenditure is zero, the increase in E 12 does not
influence y,. Therefore, Country 2 gains by increasing the contribution of its
defense expenditure, which reduces the probability of War A.
In the second case, where E12 is between and 0.75, Country 2's
expected utility is maximized when E 12 is between and 0.5. As Country 2's
commitment increases, Country 1 is likely to reduce its defense expenditures,
which has a negative impact on the probability of War B. In response, Country 2
is likely to increase its defense expenditure which has a positive impact on the
probability of both Wars A and B. As E21 increases, Country 1 gains by reducing
yv Country 2 loses by increasing y2 to compensate for Country 1's reduction.
As E 12 increases, Country 1 decreases y., due to Country 2's
increased commitment to Country 1's defense. Country 2 loses by increasing y2
to compensate for Country 1's reduction, but it gains because of the increase in
the productivity of Country 2's defense expenditure. In this case, the balance
between commitment and the disproportionate burden sharing determines the E
y
at which utility is maximized. Since the E12 maximizing Country 2's expected
utility depends on the value of E21, Country 1's behavior influences Country 2's
behavior. Country 2's behavior is changeable. Thus, it is difficult to predict how
Country 2 will behave. Therefore, an alliance is less stable than in the first case
(G1 =10, G2 = 100).
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The possibility that the two countries in Combination 3 would form
an alliance is influenced by the size of the countries. In the case where the Type
1 country, which perceives only benefits from an alliance, is much bigger than
the Type 2 country which perceives the risk and the benefit of alliance, there is a
high possibility of forming an alliance. The Type 1 country is afraid of an attack
on the Type 2 country because of insufficient deterrence by the Type 2 country;
the Type 1 country would want to intervene with the Type 2 country in order to
avoid damages from a war. Even though the Type 1 country shoulders the
entire burden of deterrence for the Type 2 country, the Type 1 country is willing
to form an alliance to deter a war. As a result, the Type 2 country does not have
to contribute to an alliance. It does not need to consider the risk from an
alliance. The Type 2 country can also benefit from an alliance. Since both
countries benefit, an alliance is highly probable and stable.
As the GDP in the Type 2 country increases, it starts to increase its
defense expenditures and contribute to the alliance. It will not be satisfied with
only the contribution of the Type 1 country. Counting on the contribution from
the Type 2 country, the Type 1 country will reduce its defense contribution. This
reduces the benefit of the alliance for both countries. Therefore, an alliance
would be less stable and the probability of forming an alliance would be lower as
the Type 2 country grows relative to the Type 1 country.
This paper discussed the case where the Type 1 country is bigger
than the Type 2 country; this can be viewed as reflecting the situation where the
Type 1 country is the United States and the Type 2 country is another smaller
country, such as Japan. However, assuming the GDP in the Type 1 country
becomes much smaller than that of the Type 2 country, the probability of forming
an alliance would become much lower.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced an alliance model with risk involving probabilities
of wars. Based on the model, there is a higher probability that the countries of
Combination 1 (when both countries perceive only benefits from an alliance) would
form an alliance, keep it, and benefit from it, assuming they continue to exchange
and monitor information about commitment to the alliance. However, it is possible
that one of the countries may be negatively affected by an alliance.
Compared to Combination 1, it is more difficult for both countries to benefit
from an alliance in Combination 2 (when both countries perceive both risks and
benefits from an alliance). Whereas both countries may benefit from an alliance in
certain specific situations, there is a much lower possibility that the countries in
Combination 2 would form an alliance.
The countries of Combination 3, where the smaller country perceives both
risks and benefits of an alliance, are likely to form an alliance. As the smaller
country grows relative to its ally, the implications for the expected level of
cooperation differs depending on the initial level of cooperation. It could turn out
that an alliance is worse for both countries. Therefore, an alliance involving the
countries in Combination 3 becomes less stable as the smaller country becomes
bigger.
In all three combinations, the probability of wars A and B, the level of
cooperation, the amount of loss from wars, countries' GDP and the countries' threat
perception influence burden sharing and the productivity of their defense
expenditure (i.e., level of commitment). The alliance formation varies with the
delicate balance between burden sharing and productivity
39
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